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algorithms are created by machines, they are often assumed to be
immune from human biases. However, algorithms are the product
of human thinking and, as such, can perpetuate existing stereotypes
and social segregation. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that
algorithms are not accountable. This Article explores problems
related to algorithmic bias, error, and discrimination which exists
due to a lack of transparency and understanding behind a machine’s
design or instruction.
This Article deals with the European Union’s legal
framework on decision-making on the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) and some Member State implementation
laws, with specific emphasis on French law. This Article argues
that the European framework does not adequately address the
algorithm’s problems of opacity and discrimination related to
machine learning processing and the explanations of automated
decision-making. The Article proceeds by evaluating limitations
to the legal remedies provided by the GDPR. In particular, the
GDPR’s lack of a right to individual explanation regarding these
decisions poses a problem. Furthermore, the Article also argues
that the GDPR allows for too many flexibilities for individual
Member States, thus failing to create a “digital single market.”
Finally, this Article proposes certain solutions to address the
opacity and bias problems of automated decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, automated decision systems appear to carry higher
social and economic risks than ever before. We often have
no information about the design or instructions the machine is given.
This easily becomes a source of biases, errors, and discrimination.
Indeed, an algorithm is not neutral and can perpetuate
existing stereotypes and social segregation. For example,
underrepresentation of a minority group in historical data may
reinforce discrimination against that group in future hiring processes
or credit-scoring.
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This Article’s subject matter deals with the European Union’s
(“EU”) legal framework on automated decision-making based on
the GDPR and some Member State implementation laws with
specific emphasis on French law. In Part I, I discuss the current role
automated decision-making plays in our society and the need for
more ethics and rulemaking to eliminate opacity and bias problems
in such technology. In Part II, I present the European legal framework. Currently, the European Union and its Member States have
enacted a more precise framework on automated decision-making,
based on the GDPR on civil and commercial matters as well as on
the Directive 2016/680/EU on criminal matters. The GDPR is
completed by guidelines from the Article 29 Working Party.1
However, I argue in particular that there is no right to an individual
explanation concerning a decision based on automated decisionmaking pursuant to the GDPR. The GDPR does not provide the data
subject with an individual right to know and understand the automated decision’s precise basis.
In Part III, I argue that, if EU lawmakers understand the issues,
their answers are not strong enough to improve the rules and
protect the vulnerable population. The exceptions give too many
flexibilities in favor of private stakeholders, public sectors, and the
Member States. Compounding the exceptions, the related safeguards, such as the right to obtain a human intervention, do not
provide for a right to an explanation either; they only afford the right
to ask for a human being, and not a machine, with whom to interact.
Nevertheless, this right does not ensure a better understanding of the
decision. Indeed, it may not be feasible for a human to conduct a
meaningful review of a process—for instance, if the process
involved third-party data and algorithms, pre-learned models, or
inherently opaque machine learning techniques. Moreover,
intellectual property rights and trade secrets create some barriers to

1

Article 29 Working Party (Art. 29 WP) was an advisory body made up of a
representative from the data protection authority of each EU Member State, the European
Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission. On May 25, 2018, it was
replaced by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) under the GDPR. All documents
related to the former Article 29 Working Party remain available, such as non-binding
guidelines which provide interpretations of EU directives and regulations on data
protection laws.
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the rights’ efficiencies, and the GDPR does not furnish limitations
to the application of such proprietary rights in the privacy context.
Finally, no supervisory body explicitly provides for guarantees to
respect such measures. Consequently, I am skeptical as to the ability
of such provisions to address the opacity and discrimination
problems of algorithms.
I also argue that too many flexibilities have been given to the
Member States, creating a variety of differing rules. After the
integration of the “EU Personal Data Package” at the national level,
one can see that the common rules between the Member States are
less numerous than expected. Consequently, despite the enactment
of an EU Regulation instead of a Directive,2 the European rules are
too weak and too diverse to adequately protect Europeans. As a
result, the GDPR also fails to create a single standard on algorithmic
transparency. This has a negative impact on the ability to create a
“digital single market,” which is one of the European Commission’s
primary goals.3
Finally, in Part IV, I consider what might be done to formulate
a better framework. I propose some solutions, which have to be
challenged and improved.
I. OPACITY, BIAS PROBLEMS OF AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING,
AND THE NEED FOR MORE ETHICS
A. Effects of “Automated Decision-Making”
Today we live in a “Scored Society”4 or “Black Box Society.”5
Digital technologies collect massive data (big data) and score people
2

Regulations have binding legal force throughout every Member State and enter into
force on a set date in all the Member States. Directives lay down certain results that must
be achieved but each Member State is free to decide how to transpose the directives into
national laws.
3
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital
Single Market Strategy for Europe, at 3, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015).
4
See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014).
5
See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 10 (2015).
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in every aspect of their lives: what they buy, what they do, what they
think, how they work, what their networks are, and how they
conduct their personal and intimate lives.6 Any and all information
can be collected and coded to produce an opinion on an individual
or to provide a right to access to an advantage, or the denial of such.
The information that is collected can be used to generate rankings
used in many circumstances, such as in job applications, social
benefits, or loans.7 A person’s online activity, like their interactions
with social networks, is an example of the kind of information used
to generate rankings.8 This scoring system is made by algorithms
instead of humans.9 As a result of predictive algorithms making
essential decisions about individuals, one’s personal life can
change.10 More broadly, this means that economic activities change:
financial markets, marketing, insurance, employment, education,
political elections, judicial decisions, and so on. Many scholars have
already shown the effects of predictive algorithms on both individual and collective situations.11
Basically, an “algorithm” is a sequence of instructions telling a
computer what to do. In the broadest sense, algorithms “are encoded
procedures for transforming input data into a desired output, based
on specified calculations.”12 This notion is broad and includes
“artificial intelligence” processing, which itself contains machine
learning and deep learning.13 The term “artificial intelligence”
applies when a machine mimics “cognitive” functions associated
with human minds, such as “learning” and “problem-solving.”14
“Machine learning” is supposed to give a computer system the
6

See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 15–17 (2013).
7
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 2, 5, 28.
8
See id. at 2.
9
See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638, 658
(2017).
10
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20.
11
See, e.g., CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3, 13, 199–204 (2016).
12
Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS
ON COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 167 (Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J.
Boczkowski & Kirsten A. Foot eds., 2014).
13
See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (2014).
14
Id. at 89, 94.
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ability to progressively improve performance on a specific task,
based on the use of data mining and massive gathering (“big data”),
without explicit programming.15 This is what is known as unsupervised learning.16 Machine learning methods are based on learning
data representations as opposed to task-specific algorithms.17 This
means that the machine “learns” by itself, in consideration of
a goal previously defined by the programmer. In contrast, human
intervention is mainly focused on the definition of goals
(task-specific algorithms) and data used.18 These tools analyze
current and historical facts, allowing the models to make predictions
(predictive models). Finally, “deep learning” architectures, such as
deep neural networks, have been applied to fields including computer vision, speech recognition, and natural language processing.19
Automated individual decision-making is based more on machine
learning than on deep learning.
Though algorithms may be problematic in some ways, several
positive elements exist as well. First, an automated decision-making
process may be more efficient than its alternative: the information
gained can be more useful and cheaper to obtain than the
information gathered through human decision-making.20 Second,
although the possibility exists that an algorithm is biased, such bias
often occurs because automated decision-makers were trained using
biased human decisions.21 Of course, not all training data is based
on bias. One such example is credit scoring, which is based on actual
payment data, not human assessments of creditworthiness.22 This is
15

See Michael Veale & Reuben Binns, Fairer Machine Learning in the Real World:
Mitigating Discrimination Without Collecting Sensitive Data, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–
Dec. 2017, at 1, 11.
16
Id.
17
See Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE
436, 436, 442 (2015).
18
See id. at 442.
19
See DAN CIREȘAN, UELI MEIER & JÜRGEN SCHMIDHUBER, DALLE MOLLE INST.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MULTI-COLUMN DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS FOR IMAGE
CLASSIFICATION 1 (2012); Surden, supra note 13, at 99.
20
See Jay Thornton, Cost, Accuracy, and Subjective Fairness in Legal Information
Technology: A Response to Technological Due Process Critics, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821,
1822 (2016).
21
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 4.
22
See id. at 5.
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an example of a situation where an algorithm may actually be less
biased than human judgment. Human bias is most likely to exist in
an algorithm where training data has been filtered through human
intervention.23 This is why sentencing and arrest data are bad
training data.
Third, algorithms are usually more accurate than the
alternative.24 Humans make messy, error-ridden assessments of
multi-dimensional information in decision-making and are subject
to numerous cognitive biases. Algorithms seem to make less errorprone assessments and seem to be less subject to biases.25
Nevertheless, we must not forget the social need to better
understand algorithms and their resulting decisions.26 Humans must
maintain control of, and be accountable for, the decisions made by
machines. For example, the scoring process is often seen as a good
method.27 It is considered progress in society because it is supposed
to be more objective and non-discriminatory than human decisionmaking.28 However, this is a common mistake. Algorithms are not
neutral and can perpetuate existing stereotypes and social segregation.29 Additionally, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and
machine learning’s capabilities have significantly facilitated the
creation of profiles and automated decisions with the potential
to impact individual’s rights and freedoms—especially when the
decision concerns an application to enter a school or to obtain
social benefits.30
23

See id. at 4.
See Thornton, supra note 20, at 1825.
25
See id. at 1835.
26
See Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling
Era, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 2012, at 42 (Jacques Bus et al. eds., 2012).
27
See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 4.
28
Id.
29
See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1030–31,
1038 (2017).
30
See, e.g., Germain Chastel, Predictive Algorithms Are Infiltrating Schools—Here’s
Why That’s a Good Thing, NEXT WEB (May 28, 2018), https://thenextweb.com
/contributors/2018/05/27/predictive-algorithms-are-infiltrating-schools-heres-why-thatsa-good-thing/ [https://perma.cc/B2NK-FY5S]; Jacob Mchangama & Hin-Yan Liu, The
Welfare State Is Committing Suicide by Artificial Intelligence, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 25,
2018, 1:00 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/25/the-welfare-state-is-committingsuicide-by-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/K59K-NM3U].
24
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Several arguments show the limits of algorithmic decisionmaking. First, predictive algorithms are based on source code,
meaning that some instructions have been given and some
data has been used. A bias problem exists when a computer system
systematically and unfairly discriminates against groups of
individuals whilst favoring others based on social or ethical
criteria.31 AI-based technologies are developed by people who may
hold explicit or implicit biases against members of underrepresented
groups. Bias may be introduced into machine learning processes at
various stages, including algorithm design.32 Most often, we have
no information about the design or instructions given to the
machine, and these could easily be a source of biases, errors,
and discrimination.
Second, bias can also be implicit,33 as some of the processes by
which the brain uses mental associations are so well-established as
to operate without awareness, intention, or control (e.g., the “White
Guy problem”).34 “Preexisting bias has its roots in social
institutions, practices, and attitudes.”35 We usually have no information on the nature and source of data,36 and many AI systems
learn to make classifications by training on data sets that reflect
sociocultural biases.37 It is unsurprising that outputs of technologies
replicate inequalities when they have been taught using biased
data.38 Selection of training data may embed existing prejudices
into automated decision-making processes. For example, under-

31

See Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 330, 332 (1996).
32
See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 14–15, 43, 51, 134 (2018).
33
SARAH E. REDFIELD, ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 1 (Sarah E. Redfield ed.,
2017).
34
Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white
-guy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/ZMW2-5ABH] (“[A]lgorithmic flaws aren’t easily
discoverable: How would a woman know to apply for a job she never saw advertised? How
might a black community learn that it were being overpoliced by software?”).
35
Friedman & Nissenbaum, supra note 31, at 332.
36
See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L.
REV. 671, 684, 717–18 (2016).
37
See Friedman & Nissenbaum, supra note 31, at 333.
38
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 13–14, 18.

2019] ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GDPR & BEYOND

101

representation of a minority group in historical data may reinforce
discrimination against that group in future hiring processes or
credit-scoring.39 “Profiling based on postal codes or even magazine
subscriptions may become a proxy for selection based on race
or gender.”40
Beyond the bias problem, the opacity of the models must also
be considered. Opacity results in a reduced margin of error while
rendering interpretation, human explanation, and recommendation
impossible.41 As the machine “learns” by itself, and human
intervention is mainly focused on the definition of task-specific
algorithms and data used, humans are not able to explain the
decision-making. Furthermore, the reasoning of the machine
(artificial intelligence) is not comparable to natural intelligence. The
machine does not “think” as a human. Consequently, a human being
is not able to pursue the lines of thinking the machine employs, and
the results produced cannot be transparent and explainable. Human
understanding is sacrificed in favor of an engineering perspective.
This is the “black box,” meaning that we do not understand the
results and decisions made by algorithms.42 Data scientists
increasingly cannot explain the processes through which algorithms
operate; they only find the efficiency of the results. Moreover,
correlations and inferences replace causality. Consequently, these
technical and legal obstacles establish asymmetric information
between, on the one hand, the users of the algorithm system and, on
the other hand, the persons about whom the results are generated. In
such circumstances, the results cannot be audited, which is probably
the best way to become aware of bias and discrimination problems.
Confirming these criticisms, Jeff Larson and his coauthors43
denounced bias of the predictive justice system, COMPAS,44 which
39

See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 36, at 684–85.
Christopher Kuner et al., Machine Learning with Personal Data: Is Data Protection
Law Smart Enough to Meet the Challenge?, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 1, 2 (2017).
41
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 10–11, 31.
42
See id. at 6, 8.
43
Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-thecompas-recidivism-algorithm [https://perma.cc/5CYH-GEJR].
44
COMPAS stands for Correctional Offender Management Profiles for Alternative
Sanction and was created by Northpointe Inc. See Tim Brennan & William Dietrich,
40
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is designed to predict the likelihood of recidivism.45 This system is
used by several states in the United States at sequential stages
of criminal justice, including at pretrial and community corrections,
probation, jail, prison, and parole.46 Its goals include accurate
risk assessment, comprehensive needs assessment, public safety,
institutional safety, fairness and racial equity, and ease of use.47
The risk of discrimination implicates the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights, and Larson and others show that the rate of false
positives (high score of risk without observed recidivism) is more
frequent for Afro-American released prisoners than for Caucasian
released prisoners.48 Alexandra Chouldechova has shown that the
learning sample, rather than the model, is biased, because the sample
reflects preexisting social biases.49 She then proves how disparate
impact can arise when a recidivism prediction instrument fails to
satisfy the criterion of error rate balance.50 Consequently, even
though COMPAS pretends to conduct periodic re-validation,
re-forming, and calibration studies,51 there is a risk of increasing
these biases.52 Despite the evidence of biases in this system, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in State v. Loomis that algorithms
can indeed be used to sentence defendants and, by extension, that
such sentences cannot be challenged on the basis of the use of such
an algorithm because the algorithm is used only as part of the

Correctional Offender Management Profiles for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), in
HANDBOOK OF RECIDIVISM RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT TOOLS 49 (Jay P. Singh et al. eds.,
2018).
45
See Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 17, 2018, at 1.
46
See Danielle Kehl, Priscilla Guo & Samuel Kessler, Algorithms in the Criminal
Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing, RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, HARV. L. SCH.,
2017, at 3, 9.
47
Brennan & Dietrich, supra note 44, at 49, 52.
48
See Larson et al., supra note 43.
49
See Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias
in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, CORNELL U. LIBR. 2, 14 (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.00056 [https://perma.cc/7VAG-GY2Q].
50
Id. at 5.
51
See generally The Northpoint Suite, EQUIVANT, http://www.equivant.com
/solutions/case-management-for-supervision [https://perma.cc/8MHX-26HN].
52
See O’NEIL, supra note 11, at 209–10.
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decision.53 Based on the due process rule,54 the defendant Loomis
argued that the proprietary nature of the software prevented a
challenge to its scientific accuracy and the data used.55 He also
asserted that the validity of the factors used to return risk scores
could include possible impermissible sentencing factors, such as
gender.56 Loomis sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court,
which it denied in June 2017.57 Thus, COMPAS still remains intact
under the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision.
Lum and Isaac examined bias in a predictive policing system
(PredPol) that was developed to flag areas where crimes
may occur.58 It appeared that the data fed into the PredPol algorithm
were already biased: police arrests for drug crimes were disproportionately located in nonwhite areas, even though drug crimes were
estimated to be distributed throughout the city in question.59 Lum
and Isaac then showed that, by training the predictive algorithm
on these data, the algorithm inappropriately flags people from
underrepresented groups as at risk of committing a crime.60
New York City uses Palantir, another system with which the
same difficulties have been observed. The tool at issue allowed data
from multiple sources to be analyzed and thereby predicted where

53

See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753–54 (Wis. 2016).
See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1251, 1281 (2008).
55
See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757, 760; see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big
Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55
B.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2014); Citron, supra note 54, at 1254, 1279.
56
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757. The court briefly raised concerns over how COMPAS’
risk factor assessment may improperly correlate with the impermissible sentencing factor
of race, before ultimately finding that COMPAS scores can still be used in sentencing. See
id. at 763–764 (“Providing information to sentencing courts on the limitations and cautions
attendant with the use of COMPAS risk assessments will enable courts to better assess the
accuracy of the assessment and the appropriate weight to be given to the risk score.”). Chief
Justice Roggensack’s concurrence in this case also cites race as an impermissible
sentencing factor. See id. at 773 (Roggensack, J., concurring).
57
Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290, 2290 (2017).
58
See Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2016,
at 14, 17.
59
See id.; see also ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING:
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 65, 67, 69–75 (2017).
60
See Lum & Isaac, supra note 58, at 19.
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crimes were likely to occur.61 A recent case, decided on December
27, 2017 by the Supreme Court of the State of New York, addressed
a dispute between the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and involved a challenge to the algorithm’s opacity.62
Petitioner based its request on the Freedom of Information Law
(FOIL) (Article 6 of the New York State Public Officers Law) and
invoked the public’s significant interest in the transparency of
predictive policing systems.63 The City of New York responded that
the NYPD has to respect the vendor’s trade secret and nondisclosure
agreement.64 Furthermore, disclosure of the predictive policing
products’ test results would discourage potential vendors from
contracting with the NYPD and thereby limit the pool of technology
available to it.65 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the State of
New York asked the NYPD to disclose the output data from the
predictive policing system starting from six months before the date
of the decision but rejected the request for disclosure of the input
data.66 This decision is a first step toward more transparency.
B. Need for More “Ethical” Algorithms and Automated DecisionMaking
Algorithms and machine learning should not be viewed solely
from an engineering perspective.67 Such an approach must be
complemented by a cognitive and human perspective with social
considerations.68 The lack of algorithms’ oversight is socially

61

See Peter Waldman, Lizette Chapman & Jordan Robertson, Palantir Knows
Everything About You, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com
/features/2018-palantir-peter-thiel [https://perma.cc/KZ8Q-MMNA].
62
See Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 2017 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 5138, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2017).
63
See Brennan Ctr., 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5138, at *5 (citing New York Public
Officers Law § 87(2)).
64
See Brennan Ctr., 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5138, at *8.
65
See Brennan Ctr., 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5138, at *8–9.
66
See Brennan Ctr., 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5138, at *21.
67
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 6–7.
68
Id.
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unacceptable.69 In this context, there is a social need for more fairness, accountability, and transparency of the algorithms70 to
challenge the biases and opacity of the results. Scholars, civil society
organizations, and policymakers are increasingly asking for more
algorithmic accountability, especially where individual decisions
are solely based on an automatic system used by public agents. The
need for “ethics of algorithms”71 is observable in Europe72 and also
in the United States.73 Some scholars associate algorithms with
69

Id. at 8.
Discussions are already underway in this arena—for example, the FAT conference
(Fairness, Accountability, Transparency) on algorithmic systems is a multi-disciplinary
conference that brings together researchers and practitioners interested in fairness,
accountability, and transparency in socio-technical systems. See ACM Conference on
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAT*), FAT CONFERENCE,
https://fatconference.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/X62U-26FR].
71
See Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate,
BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2016, at 1; Mireille Hildebrandt, The New Imbroglio—
Living with Machine Algorithms, in THE ART OF ETHICS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY:
MIND YOU 56, 57–58 (Liisa Janssens ed., 2016).
72
See, e.g., MIHALIS KRITIKOS, SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT UNIT, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE, WHAT IF ALGORITHMS COULD ABIDE BY ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES? 1 (2018) (providing as a European example the reinforcement of
stigmatization of certain populations through measures taken by local councils in the UK
which use algorithms to bring certain families to the attention of child protective services);
see also Hildebrandt, supra note 26, at 41 (for instance, the draft GDPR included a
provision on “the right to object and profiling,” recognizing a right to object to automated
decisions to protect against the possibility of being unethically profiled by algorithms).
73
The City of New York enacted a local law on automated decision systems used by
agencies on January 11, 2018 (returned unsigned by the Mayor on January 17, 2018). See
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49; see also File #: Int 1696-2017, N.Y.C. CITY COUNCIL,
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D
-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0 [https://perma.cc/4YWC-T538]. According to N.Y.C.
Local Law No. 49, “‘automated decision system’ means computerized implementations of
algorithms, including those derived from machine learning or other data processing or
artificial intelligence techniques, which are used to make or assist in making decisions . . .
concerning rules, policies or actions implemented that impact the public.” N.Y.C. Local
Law No. 49. The scope of this law is broad: it includes the use of algorithms, including
artificial intelligence and machine learning processing. The purpose is to make or assist a
decision. Id. The system has to be used by an agency appointed by the mayor in compliance
with section 1-112 of the administrative code of the city of New York and the decision has
to have an impact on the public. Id. This law doesn’t yet furnish some provisions to regulate
algorithms. It only states the creation of a task force, which was nominated on May 16,
2018 and will explore how New York City uses algorithms. See Press Release, Office of
the Mayor, The City of New York, Mayor de Blasio Announces First-In-Nation Task Force
to Examine Automated Decision Systems Used by the City (May 16, 2018), available at
70
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six types of ethical problems: inconclusive evidence, inscrutable
evidence, misguided evidence, unfair outcomes, negative transformative effects, and lack of traceability.74 Broadly speaking, more
transparency, fairness, and accountability are required.
Early on, the need for more transparency was demanded from
the creators of algorithms. Nevertheless, one can easily understand
that this is not relevant to governing algorithms because seeing does
not mean knowing.75 Seeing the inner workings of a system does not
lead to understanding and controlling it. Plus, examining the code
or pseudo-code would lead to a de-contextualization of the algorithm, which can frequently mutate. Although it is helpful to figure
out how an existing technology works through reverse engineering,
this process misses how the technology came to be this way (i.e., the
socio-cultural embedding of code).76 Besides, there are often
technical limitations to a systematic approach because of the
system’s owners.
Consequently, our goal is not to consider the ways to “open the
box.” First, it may not be technically useful, because the algorithms
are increasingly complex, especially the artificial intelligence
systems. Moreover, the instructions could be unsupervised by
programmers and hardly understandable for people. Second, having
access to the algorithms once is not relevant if the instructions

https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/251-18/mayor-de-blasio-first-in-nationtask-force-examine-automated-decision-systems-used-by [https://perma.cc/JM3K-7YA4].
It is the first of its kind in the United States, and it will work to develop a process for
reviewing “automated decision systems,” commonly known as algorithms, through the lens
of equity, fairness and accountability. Id. It will provide some recommendations on how
information on agency automated decision systems may be shared with the public and how
agencies may address instances where people are harmed by agency automated decision
systems. See N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49. More precisely, it aims to produce a report in
December 2019 recommending criteria to determine which agency of the City is concerned
and how implement procedures for reviewing and assessing City algorithmic tools to
ensure equity and opportunity. Id.
74
Mittelstadt et al., supra note 71, at 4–5.
75
See Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 973, 980 (2016).
76
See Nick Seaver, On Reverse Engineering: Looking for the Cultural Work of
Engineers, MEDIUM (Jan. 27, 2014), https://medium.com/anthropology-and-algorithms/
on-reverse-engineering-d9f5bae87812 [https://perma.cc/D8MS-XZ6Z].
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change without predictability. Third, because of trade secret
and intellectual property laws, this request may not be legally
permissible in many cases. Consequently, the social need for more
knowledge and understanding requires consideration of the
purposes of fairness and accountability.
Some legal scholars consider the notion of “fairness” an answer
to requests for social justice.77 Nevertheless, one can observe some
diverging conceptions of just how algorithms achieve it.78
The fairness of algorithms depends on their objectives.79 Even if
decisions are statistically derived and made consistently, actual
fairness is not always achieved.80 Moreover, even if an accurate
algorithm exists, it “leads to generalizations about particular
groups.”81 For instance, an algorithm “comes to the blanket conclusion that men tend to deserve higher risk scores than women.”82
“[W]ould it be fair [or even legal] for individuals to be judged based
on immutable characteristics such as gender?”83 Consequently,
fairness by itself is not the best way to answer the need for less
discriminatory algorithms.
Accountability starts with an agent and the outcome of its
actions; the data holder (controller or processor) is accountable for
ensuring compliance with the principles (and rights of the data
subject).84 The data holder is also supposed to have a mechanism in
place to ensure compliance. Assumptions about computing and
features of situations in which computers produce outcomes create
four barriers to accountability: many people collaborate on systems

77

See Kehl et al., supra note 46, at 30.
See id.
79
See id.
80
See id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119), recitals 74, 79–80, at 14, 15–16 [hereinafter
General Data Protection Regulation].
78
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(“problem of many hands”); errors tend to be pervasive and inevitable (“problem of bugs”); the temptation for “blaming the computer”
is strong; and software ownership is not accompanied by liability.85
Even if the relevance of the principle of accountability is reduced in a computerized context, the need for accountability is more
and more ripe.86 Some actions decided by algorithms (i.e., automated decision-making) cause harms (or contribute significantly to
causing them), and actions guided by faulty decisions or intentions
(i.e., actions involving recklessness or negligence) should result in
the data holder being held accountable or, eventually, liable.
I argue that current ethical requirements are too vague to enforce
fair and compliant behavior of these automated decision-making
tools’ users. Self-regulation is not powerful enough to address these
issues. Clear and binding rules are needed to fight against discrimination risks, on the one hand, and, on the other, to ensure the
accountability of such automated decisions.
II. EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS
The European Union enacted a framework on automated
decision-making (Article 22) in the General Data Protection
Regulation 2016/679 (the “GDPR”) on April 27, 2016.87 In Section
A, this Article discusses the GDPR’s provisions for measures on

85

See Helen Nissenbaum, Accountability in a Computerized Society, 2 SCI. & ENG’G
ETHICS 25, 25 (1996).
86
Paul B. de Laat, Algorithmic Decision-Making Based on Machine Learning from Big
Data: Can Transparency Restore Accountability?, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 525, 526–27 (2018).
87
The GDPR introduces some new provisions to address the risks inherent to profiling
and automated decision-making. Statutory regulation of “automated individual decisions”
by European data protection is not new. It was previously and explicitly addressed in
Article 15 and Recital 41 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EU. Compare General
Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 41, art. 15, at 8, 43, with Directive
1995/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data 95/46/EC, art. 15, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 43 [hereinafter Directive
95/46/EC]. Nevertheless, the GDPR extends the protection against decisions made solely
by automated processing to cover profiling of data subjects, and more generally, any other
form of automated processing. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84,
recital 41, art. 15, at 8, 43.
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civil and commercial matters, while Section B highlights the Directive 2016/680/EU concerning criminal matters. This Part will
conclude with a discussion of the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines on automated decision-making and profiling, which completes
the EU legal provisions on automated decision systems.
A. EU Legal Framework on Civil and Commercial Matters
(GDPR)
This Section focuses first on the rights of data subjects that the
GDPR strengthens. The second sub-section will outline some exceptions to such rights, with their attendant safeguards.
1. Rights of the Data Subject
a) Rights to Be Informed (Articles 13 and 14) and to
Access (Article 15)
The data subject has several rights to be informed. They have (i)
the right to know the existence of an automated decision-making
system and that such system is used for his situation; (ii) the right to
receive meaningful information concerning the logic involved; and
(iii) the right to receive meaningful information on the significance
and the contemplated consequences for his situation.88 First, regardless of whether the data subject’s personal data are collected from
the data subject himself (Article 13, Section 2) or not (Article 14,
Section 2), the controller shall provide the data subject the necessary
information to ensure fair and transparent processing.89
Given the fact that the GDPR is founded on the core principle of
transparency, controllers must ensure that they explain clearly and
simply to individuals how the profiling or automated decisionmaking process works. In particular, where the processing involves
profiling, the basis of such profiling must be made clear to the data
subject. Furthermore, Article 15, Section 1 states that “[t]he
data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller
confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or
88

Id. at 41–42. Whether personal data related to a data subject are collected from the
data subject (art. 13 § 2) or not (art. 14 § 2), the controller shall provide the data subject
with some information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing. Id.
89

Id.
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her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the
personal data and . . . information.”90 What information the data
subject has access to is of particular concern. The language of the
GDPR indicates that the data subject should have access to “meaningful information about the logic involved, as well the significance
and envisaged consequences of such processing for such data
subject[s],” particularly in those cases where automated decisionmaking exists, such as those referred to in Article 22, Sections 1 and
4.91 According to the Article 29 Working Party, “the controller has
a duty to make available the data used as input to create the profile
as well as access to information on the profile and details of [the]
segments” of the data.92 Nevertheless, Recital 63 provides some
protection for controllers concerned about revealing trade secrets or
intellectual property and, in particular, the copyright protecting
the software, which may be particularly relevant in relation to
profiling.93 However, the Article 29 Working Party has reasoned
that “controllers cannot rely on the protection of their trade secrets
as an excuse to deny access or refuse to provide information to the
data subject.”94
b) Rights to Rectification and Erasure (Articles 16 and 17)
Profiling can involve an element of prediction, which increases
the risk of inaccuracy. The input data may be inaccurate, or irrelevant, or taken out of context. There may be something wrong with
the algorithm used to identify correlations. For example, Article 16
might apply where an individual is placed into a category that
reveals something about his or her ability to perform a task, and such
profiling is based on incorrect information. “Article 16 also provides
90

Id. at 43.
Id.
92
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED
INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND PROFILING FOR THE PURPOSES OF REGULATION
2016/679, WP 251, at 17, (Feb 6. 2018) [hereinafter Working Party Guidelines]. Article 29
Working Group is composed of National Data Protection Authorities under the Directive
95/46/EC, Article 29 (up to May 25, 2018). Since this date, this Group becomes the
European Data Protection Board. See All of the Article 29 Working Party Guidelines,
Opinions, and Documents, IAPP, https://iapp.org/resources/article/all-of-the-article-29working-party-guidelines-opinions-and-documents/ [https://perma.cc/A8BD-AUFK].
93
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 63, at 12.
94
Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 17.
91
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to the data subject the right to [supplement] the personal data with
additional information.”95 Finally, the “rights to rectification and
erasure apply to both the ‘input personal data’ (the personal data
used to create the profile) and the ‘output data’ (the profile itself or
‘score’ assigned to the person).”96
c) Right Not to be Subject to an Automated Decision
(Article 22)
Article 22, Section 1 of the GDPR concerns “[a]utomated
individual decision-making, including profiling.”97 In principle, the
first paragraph states that “[t]he data subject shall have the right not
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing,
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or
her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”98 This right is
directly linked with the right to know (Articles 13-15): to exercise
the right not to be subject to an automated decision, the data subject
first needs to know if he is subject to it.99 The right provided by
Article 22 supposes three conditions: (i) a decision was made that is
(ii) based solely on automated processing and that (iii) has legal effects or similarly significant consequences.100 Examples of this are
automatic refusal of an online credit application and e-recruiting
practices without any human intervention (Recital 71).101 “The
controller cannot avoid the Article 22 provisions by fabricating
human involvement.”102 For example, if someone routinely applies
automatically generated profiles to individuals without any actual
influence on the result, this would still be a decision based solely
on automated processing:
To qualify as human involvement, the controller must ensure
that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than just
a token gesture. It should be carried out by someone who has the
95

Id. at 18.
Id.
97
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 22, at 46.
98
Id.
99
See id. at 40–43, 46. Consequently, Articles 22 and Articles 13–15 must be understood
all together.
100
See Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 20–22.
96

101
102

See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 14.
See Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 21.
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authority and competence to change the decision. As part of the
analysis, [he or she] should consider all the relevant data.103
Despite the term “right,” the Article 29 Working Party considers that
Article 22 does not apply just when actively invoked by the data
subject.104 “Article 22 [establishes] a general prohibition” on
individual decision-making, including profiling, “based solely
on automated processing.”105 Consequently, individuals are automatically protected from the potential effects that this type of
processing may have.
2. Broad Exceptions to the Rights
Article 22, Section 2 provides for three exceptions to the right
not to be subject to an automated decision106: (a) if such decision is
necessary under a contract;107 (b) if such decision is authorized by
European Union or Member State laws; and (c) if a data subject
explicitly consents to the decision.108 Otherwise, the EU rule
provides for a default right not to be subject to automated decisionmaking. In the United States, the assumption is that a company or
agency or person can use algorithmic decision-making however it
wants, unless specifically prohibited by some rule.109 For this
reason, EU law seems to provide a better framework for protecting
data subjects than U.S. law.110

103

Id.
Id. at 19.
105
Id.
106
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 22, at 46 (stating that “suitable
measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights . . . freedoms . . . and legitimate interests”
have to be in place when the exceptions apply).
107
Id. (“If the decision: (a) is necessary for the entering into, or performance of, a contract
between the data subject and a data controller.”).
108
Id. The first two exceptions were previously provided by the Directive 95/46/EC (art.
15). See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 87, at 43. Such exceptions are broad.
109
See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 104, 122 Stat. 881, 901 (2008). Here, the default is flipped: you cannot do it unless the
nation has specifically permitted it. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84,
art. 22(2)(b), at 46.
110
Defaults matter, empirically, and the burden to specifically allow something is much
higher than the burden of doing nothing.
104
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a) Performance of a Contract
“Controllers may wish to use solely automated decision-making
processes for contractual purposes because . . . routine human
involvement can sometimes be impractical or impossible due to the
sheer quantity of data being processed.”111 “The controller must be
able to show that this type of processing is necessary, taking into
account whether a less privacy-intrusive method could be
adopted.”112 Otherwise, “it would not be ‘necessary’” and therefore
not justified.113
b) Decision Authorized by Union or Member State Law
The automated decision-making has to be “expressly authorized
by [a] Union or Member State law to which the controller is
subject. . . .”114 Such automated decision-making includes,
for instance, “fraud and tax-evasion monitoring and prevention
purposes.”115
c) Explicit Consent
This new exception has to be defined according to Article 4,
Section 11.116 A specific consent supposes that the data subject
understands the existence and meaning of automated decisionmaking and the envisaged consequences for his or her situation.
d) Safeguards to the Exceptions as Rights
In comparison to Article 15 of the Directive 95/46/EC, Article
22, Section 3 of the GDPR sets forth new guarantees.117 When the
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Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 23.
Id.
113
Id.
114
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 71, at 14.
115
Id. The prevention purposes have to be “conducted in accordance with the regulations,
standards and recommendations of Union institutions or national oversight bodies and to
ensure the security and reliability of a service provided by the controller . . . .” Id.
116
Section 11 states that the “‘consent’ of the data subject [is] any freely given, specific,
informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by
a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of
personal data relating to him or her . . . .” Id. art. 4(11), at 34.
117
Compare Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 87, at 43, with General Data Protection
Regulation, supra note 84, at 46.
112
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exceptions apply, “the data controller shall implement suitable
measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests.”118 These rights are a non-exhaustive list of
“suitable measures.”119 The controller has to respect, at a minimum,
the “right to obtain human intervention,” the right for the data subject to “express his or her point of view,” and the right “to contest
the decision.”120 These requirements could be justified by one of the
purposes of the GDPR—to improve the protection based on Article
8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.121 Nevertheless, the
right to contest the decision is not a right to reconsider it. Furthermore, human intervention is a key element, and any review must
be carried out by someone who has the appropriate authority and
capability to change the decision. Otherwise, this right would be
useless. The reviewer should undertake a thorough assessment of all
relevant data, including any additional information provided by the
data subject.
B. EU Legal Framework on Criminal Matters
Council Directive 2016/680 was enacted the same day as the
GDPR.122 This text repealed the Council Framework Decision
2008/977/JHA.123 For the first time in criminal law, Article 11 limits
automated individual decision-making.124 Paragraph 1 states that
118

Id. art. 22, at 46.
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. recital 1, at 1.
122
Council Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or
Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA,
2016 O.J. (L 119) 90 (EU) (elaborating on the protection of natural persons with regard to
the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention,
investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offenses or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the free movement of such data) [hereinafter Council Directive
2016/680].
123
Id. at 89.
124
See id. at 109. Before the Directive, a decision-cadre was enacted but did not contain
any provision concerning the automated decision-making. See Council Framework
Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the Protection of Personal Data
Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.
119
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“Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on
automated processing, including profiling, which produces an
adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or significantly
affects him or her, to be prohibited . . . .”125 As opposed to Article
22, Section 1 of the GDPR, this provision is a prohibition governing
the data controller and not a right afforded to the data subject, which
is quite different.126 Specifically, there are fewer guarantees in the
case of a breach of the law.
Article 11, Section 1 also provides some exceptions if the
automated individual decision-making is “authori[z]ed by Union or
Member State law to which the controller is subject and which
provides appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the
data subject, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the
part of the controller.”127 This exception and its safeguards are the
same as in the GDPR Article 22, Section 2(b).128 Paragraph 2 does
not authorize decisions that should be based on sensitive data,
except if suitable measures are in place to safeguard the data subject’s rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests.129 Nevertheless, the
profiling of natural persons based on sensitive data through which
they can be discriminated against is prohibited.130
The GDPR and the Directive provide a legal framework to limit
automated decision-making but are completed by Guidelines from
the Article 29 Working Party.

125

Council Directive 2016/680, supra note 122, at 109.
Compare General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 46, with Council
Directive 2016/680, supra note 122, at 109.
127
Council Directive 2016/680, supra note 122, at 109.
128
Compare General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 46, with Council
Directive 2016/680, supra note 122, at 109.
129
Council Directive 2016/680, supra note 122, at 110.
130
Id. Article 11, section 3 is in accordance with articles 21 and 52 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Recital 38 adds that the safeguards should include the provision of
specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, in
particular to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision
reached after such assessment or to challenge the decision. Id. at 95.
126
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C. Guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party on Automated
Decision-Making and Profiling
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, adopted on
February 6, 2018, sets forth Guidelines on automated decisionmaking and profiling for the purpose of Regulation 2016/679.131
Among all the recommendations, I will focus on the transparency
and fairness requirements.
The GDPR only defines “profiling,” which is related to
automated decision-making. According to Article 4, Section 4,
profiling is:
[A]ny form of automated processing of personal data
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate
certain personal aspects relating to a natural person,
in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning
that natural person’s performance at work, economic
situation, health, personal preferences, interests,
reliability, behavior, location or movements.132
Consequently, profiling is composed of three elements: (1) an automated form of processing (2) carried out on personal data, (3) the

131

Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 2. The Guidelines reveal the issues
concerning the fairness, transparency, and accountability requirements for algorithms. Id.
at 6. The Guidelines note:
The GDPR introduces provisions to ensure that profiling and
automated individual decision-making (whether or not this includes
profiling) are not used in ways that have an unjustified impact on
individuals’ rights; for example:

specific transparency and fairness requirements;

greater accountability obligations;

specified legal bases for the processing;

rights of individuals to oppose profiling and, specifically,
profiling for marketing; and,

if certain conditions are met, the need to carry out a data
protection impact assessment [DPIA].
Id. at 6.
132
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 4, at 33.
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object of which is to evaluate personal aspects about a natural person.133 Article 4, Section 4 refers to “any form of automated processing” rather than “solely automated processing” (referred to in
Article 22).134
The GDPR states that “profiling” is the “automated processing
of personal data [for] evaluating personal aspects” and, in particular,
for analyzing or making predictions about individuals.135 The use of
the word “evaluating” suggests that profiling involves some form
of assessment or judgments about a person. According to the Article
29 Working Party guidelines, profiling means “gathering information about an individual (or a group of individuals) and
evaluating their characteristics or behavioral patterns” in order to
categorize them, and to analyze and/or make predictions about their
ability to perform a task, their interests, or their likely behavior.136
For instance, the data broker compiles the data collected from
different public and private sources to develop profiles on the individuals and places them into segments that outline important aspects
of consumer needs, consumer behavior, brand preferences, product
usage levels, and so on. The data broker sells this information to
companies who wish to improve the targeting of their goods and
services. He carries out profiling by placing a person into a certain
category according to his or her interests.
Whether something is “automated decision-making,” as defined
in Article 22, Section 1 will depend upon the circumstances. Indeed,
“automated decision-making” has a different scope than profiling
and its results may partially overlap with, or result from, profiling.
“Solely automated decision-making is the ability to make decisions
by technological means without human involvement.”137 Automated
decisions can be made with or without profiling, and profiling can
take place without making automated decisions. However, profiling
and automated decision-making are not necessarily separate
activities. Something that starts off as a simple automated decision-

133
134
135
136
137

See Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 71, at 14.
Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 7.
Id. at 8.
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making process could become a process based on profiling, depending upon how the data is used. Decisions that are not solely automated might also include profiling. For example, before granting a
mortgage, a bank may consider the credit score of the borrower, with
humans carrying out additional meaningful intervention before any
decision is applied to an individual.
Finally, according to these guidelines, there are three potential
ways in which profiling may be used: “(i) general profiling;
(ii) decision-making based on profiling; and (iii) solely automated
decision-making,” (including profiling) which may legally affect the
data subject, or otherwise significantly affects the data subject.138
Additional safeguards and restrictions apply in this third case.
The GDPR and the Directive provide a legal framework to
address the social need for accountability of automated decisionmaking. Generally speaking, these rules are protective of data
subjects. Nevertheless, I observe several limits.
III. LIMITS OF THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON AUTOMATED
DECISION-MAKING
Despite the goal of protecting the data subjects and promoting
the understanding of the issues by EU lawmakers, I argue that the
given solutions are insufficient to improve the previous rules and
protect the vulnerable populations against the risks of opacity and
discrimination of algorithms. Specifically, the exceptions afford too
much flexibility in favor of the private and public players as well as
the Member States, based on the GDPR and Directive 2016/680/EU.
Consequently, this protection is too weak and too diverse. Each of
these shortcomings will be addressed in turn.
A. A Weak Protection Related to Automated Decision-Making and
Profiling
The provisions contain many internal limits to the protection of
data subjects. However, personal data legislation is not the only way
to achieve the goal of protecting natural persons against algorithmic

138

Id.
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discrimination. Other fields of law have to be considered.
Consequently, some external limits must be taken into account.
1. Internal Limits of the EU Personal Data Legislation
a) Limits Concerning the Right to Have Meaningful
Information About the Logic Involved
The first difficulty is understanding how to satisfy the requirement of having “meaningful information about the logic
involved,”139 especially in cases where a machine learning process
involves multiple data sources, dynamic development, and elements
that are opaque, whether for technological or proprietary reasons.140
The growth and complexity of machine learning can make it challenging to understand how an automated decision-making process
or profiling works. One should evaluate what will constitute
“meaningful information” about “logic” from the perspective of the
data subject. As shown above, disclosure of the algorithms’ full code
and detailed technical descriptions of machine learning processes
are unlikely to help. “A high-level, non-technical description of the
decision-making process is more likely to be meaningful.”141
Moreover, intellectual property (“IP”) rights and trade secrets create
some barriers, and neither the GDPR nor the Directive provide
exceptions or limitations to the scope of such proprietary rights.142
A potential conflict of legal norms between IP rights and data
protection rights resolves in favor of the former.
According to the Article 29 Working Party, “[t]he controller
should find simple ways to tell the data subject about the rationale
behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching the decision.”143 The
GDPR requires the controller to provide meaningful information
about the logic involved, but not necessarily a complex explanation

139

General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 15(1)(h), at 43.
See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1373–74 (2018).
141
Kuner et al., supra note 40, at 2.
142
The GDPR and the Directive state only the respect for intellectual property rights
without provision to conciliate them with the requirement of transparency. See, e.g.,
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 63, at 12.
143
Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 25.
140
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of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm.144 The
information provided should, however, be sufficiently comprehensive for the data subject to understand the reasons for the
decision.145 Nevertheless, such provisions cannot give guarantees
against biases and discrimination, and the data subject only knows
the consequences of such systems and ignores potential biases.
Moreover, one has no way to prove the existence of biases or avoid
them. Finally, these measures are insufficient to avoid the main risks
of algorithms concerning biases and discrimination.
Besides, there is a debate among scholars as to whether Articles
13–15 and 22 of the GDPR provide the right to an explanation.146 A
reconciliation147 or explanation148 can be found, but the explanation
is not necessary.149 Indeed, meaningful information about the logic
involved does not mean a right to an explanation. It does not provide
the data subject with an individual right to know and understand
what exactly happened to him. Nevertheless, the “suitable
measures” of Article 22, Section 3 are not an exhaustive list of
rights, and “[t]he only other right that might benefit a data subject
would be a right to be given an explanation for an automated
decision.”150 The explicit mention of this right in the GDPR occurs

144
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 58, at 11 (stating that
the principle of transparency is “of particular relevance in situations where the proliferation
of actors and the technological complexity of practice makes it difficult for the data subject
to know and understand whether, by whom and for what purpose personal data relating to
him or her are being collected, such as in the case of online advertising.”).
145
See id.
146
See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, “Meaningful Information” and the Right
to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 233, 234 (2017). Compare Bryce Goodman &
Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making and a
“Right to Explanation,” AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 50, 55–56, with Sandra Wachter, Brent
Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making
Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76,
77 (2017).
147
See Selbst & Powles, supra note 146, at 241–42.
148
See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 189, 192–93 (2019).
149
See Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to
Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
18, 21, 81 (2017).
150
Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions
Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW: REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 8, 15 (Tatiani
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only in Recital 71, which is not binding.151 It states that: “[S]uch
processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should
include specific information to the data subject and the right to
obtain . . . an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.”152 Consequently, there may be
a tension between the Article 22 right to obtain general information
about a decision-making process and the right “to obtain . . . an
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to
challenge the decision,” included in Recital 71.153 According to
some scholars, “[a]lthough not directly binding, [Recital 71] may
embolden regulators and courts to try to compel data controllers to
provide explanations of specific outcomes in particular cases, and
not merely ‘meaningful information’ about ‘logic’ in general.”154
However, because Recital 71 is not binding, it cannot be used as a
basis to claim a right.155 Moreover, nobody knows if the European
Court of Justice will broadly interpret Article 22 pursuant to Recital
71. At this step, it seems too early to affirm the existence of such
right to an explanation, even implicitly. Finally, this question is not
the most relevant concerning the impact of the GDPR.156
b) Limits Concerning the Safeguards
The rights outlined in the GDPR do not include a right to an
explanation. These rights merely afford the right to ask for a human
being, and not a machine, with whom to interact, without ensuring
a better understanding. Moreover, even if there is human intervention, it may not be feasible to conduct a meaningful review of a
process. For instance, if the process may have involved third-party
data and algorithms, pre-learned models, or inherently opaque

Synodiou et al. eds., 2017). See also General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at
46.
151
152

153
154

See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 71, at 14.
Id.

Id. at 14, 46.

Kuner et al., supra note 40, at 2.
See Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 150, at 85.
156
Roland Vogl, Brian Casey & Ashkon Farhangi, Rethinking Explainable Machines:
The GDPR’s “Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in
Enterprise, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 142, 151 (2019).
155

122

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:91

machine learning techniques, it may not be possible to inform data
subjects about more than the machine.157
For its part, the right to contest a decision could be a sort of right
to appeal. Nevertheless, the legal framework lacks any guarantees
regarding a potential right to reconsider a decision, or even
sufficient information to that effect. What will concretely happen if
a data subject contests? Maybe he could lose the right to obtain a
decision if he does not accept an automated one. In the event the
subject gets a real second chance at obtaining another decision, there
is no way to know whether the decision would be manual or automated, since no requirement as to the type exists. Affording the data
subject the right to demand a manual re-examination of the decision
would offer a higher level of protection.
Some limits to the right not to be subject to a decision based
on automated processing (Article 22, Section 1 and Directive
2016/680/UE, Article 11) are observable in these provisions’ terms.
First, this right concerns the decision based “solely” on automated
processing. This means that automated processing could be used
without any restrictions, limitations, or guarantees if it is not the
only means for making the decision. However, it is very easy to
pretend that other processes are used to make a decision, although
it would not be true. The lack of control prevents understanding of
the decision. Moreover, decisions made by machines have a strong
impact on human decisions. It is very difficult to make a different
decision than the one suggested by the machine and to justify
it. Second, a decision based on automated processing has to
produce legal effects concerning the data subject, or otherwise to
“significantly” affect them. However, the automated individual
decision may have a negative or discriminatory impact without
producing legal effects or significantly affecting the data subject.
Moreover, what does “significantly” mean? It is difficult to draw the
line between what is “significant” and not. It seems to require a high
level of impact, although an impact that is not “significant” could
have a very negative effect on the data subject.

157

See id. at 185–86.
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The “explicit consent” provision is an exception to the right not
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing.158
How should this exception apply? As Cate and others have said,
“[t]o be sufficiently ‘specific,’ will a separate consent be required
for each situation in which personal data are to be processed for
automated decision-making, for example, in particular employment,
financial, or medical contexts?”159 Such interpretation may be too
stringent for the data controller and not necessarily helpful to the
data subject. Moreover, the overload of information can kill the
meaning by obtaining explicit consent without being informed and
being freely given. Indeed, “[i]t is standard practice, at least at the
internet context, for companies to prompt data subjects to consent to
various data-processing operations.”160 Besides, must the data
controller provide an opportunity to revoke the consent? Moreover,
even if we consider “an algorithmic process,” which “can in theory
be explained,” how can we do that in a meaningful and intelligible
way to a data subject to obtain a real consent?161 Consequently,
will it be meaningful for him? Finally, the prohibition concerning
the sensitive data provided by Article 22, Section 4 also can
be derogated by obtaining explicit consent. The inclusion of the
exception for explicit consent impacts the data subject’s interest.
To compare this with Article 15 of Directive 95/46/EC, Article
22 of the GDPR specifically accounts for profiling,162 which was the
subject of many debates during the adoption of this regulation.163
Recital 71 provides some guarantees in case of error or discrimination.164 These measures go in the right direction. Nevertheless, they
158

General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, arts. 9(2)(a), 22, at 38, 46.
Kuner et al., supra note 40, at 2 (Fred H. Cate, an Editor at International Data
Privacy Law, is a co-author of this article).
160
Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 150, at 96.
161
Kuner et al., supra note 40, at 1–2.
162
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 22, at 46 (providing some
guidelines on automated decision-making and profiling for the purpose of Regulation
2016/679, which reveals the issues concerning the fairness, transparency and
accountability requirements of algorithms). Cf. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 87, at 43.
163
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 14 (stating that profiling is
“any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data
to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person”).
164
See id. (stating “the controller should use appropriate mathematical or statistical
procedures for the profiling, implement technical and organisational measures appropriate
159

124

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:91

are only provided by an unbinding recital and not by the text itself.
The same limit can be found at the end of Recital 71, which adds
that such a measure on the profiling should not apply to children.165
This wording is not reflected in the article itself, so this provision
does not represent an absolute prohibition, as safeguards have to
be in place and appropriate for children. Such provisions are essential. However, they may only have a potential influence on the future
decisions of the European Court of Justice if the Court decides to
use them.
Despite the GDPR’s purpose of improving the protection of
Europeans in a digital context and the new basis of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights (Article 8), the protection does not seem so
efficient. Article 22’s ability to have a practical impact on automated
profiling, particularly when applied to decisional systems that are
complex and opaque, is also doubtful. Many activities and business
models of the digital economy are based on massive data processing
and algorithmic systems. Consequently, being compliant with the
GDPR usually requires many changes in personal data processing in
order to respect the rights of the data subjects.

to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are
corrected . . . and the risk of errors is minimised.”). The controller also should:
secure personal data in a manner that takes account of the potential risks
involved for the interests and rights of the data subject and that
prevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the
basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs,
trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation,
or that result in measures having such an effect.
Id. These provisions focus on the sensitive data, and the recital adds that “automated
decision-making and profiling based on special categories of personal data should be
allowed only under specific conditions.” Id.
165 See id. at 14. Recital 38 states:
Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data,
as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards
concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal
data. Such specific protection should, in particular, apply to the use
of personal data of children for the purposes of marketing
or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of
personal data with regard to children when using services offered
directly to a child.
Id. at 7.
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2. External Limits of the EU Personal Data Legislation
First, beyond the content of a specific text, such as the GDPR,
a personal data statute is not necessarily the best way to ensure
protection against the biases and opacity of algorithms. Indeed,
the material scope of this kind of legislation is traditionally the
protection of “personal data” or “personally identifiable information” from natural persons, and the goal is to achieve this
protection by giving them some individual rights.166 For instance,
Article 22 of the GDPR focuses on automated individual decisionmaking.167 What about automated collective decision-making concerning a group? Discrimination toward a group of persons can also
be observed. Moreover, an individual discriminatory decision is
often taken with consideration of multiple criteria, such as a
category of people (e.g., black people, young people, women).
Consequently, the problem of discrimination is a global one
that concerns not only a specific person but, more generally,
some groups of people who represent the vulnerable populations.
Personal data legislation cannot properly address the issue of
algorithmic transparency, and this subject matter has to be
considered separately.
Finally, there are challenges with the efficiency of personal data
legislation in its interrelations with other fields of law. The need for
more algorithmic transparency also has to be considered in light of
competition law, consumer law, and, eventually, the constitutional
law of other countries (e.g., First Amendment and free speech). All
of these fields overlap to address the algorithmic problems. For
more efficiency, the question has to be thought of in global terms.
The same conclusion applies concerning the regulator’s choices. It
seems to be insufficient to give the data protection authorities the
task of controlling the algorithms. In the EU, many of the Member
States do not have the resources to do it seriously, especially with
respect to providing an oversight for the more complex and
opaque algorithms.
Finally, the efficiency of the GDPR will depend on the capacity
of the EU Member States to create some processes and tools to
166
167

See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 23, at 46.
See id.
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enforce the law. This sort of challenge afflicts not just Article 22
rights, but more broadly the provisions of the GDPR as well.
B. A Diverse Protection Related to Automated Decision-Making
and Profiling
After the integration of the “personal data package” at the
national level, I point out that the commonality of the frameworks
between the Member States is smaller than expected. The GDPR
affords many flexibilities to the Member States to determine their
requirements (opening clauses) at the national level, such as Article
22, Section 2(b).168 As some scholars have said, “Article 22, Section
2(b) opens up [the possibility] for a great deal of nationally authorised automated decisional processes with potentially differing standards [to] be[] applied from country to country, thereby undermining
the harmonisation aims of the Regulation.”169 Without pretending to
consider all of these national laws, I will study the implementation
of the EU provisions on: (1) civil and commercial matters, and (2)
criminal matters in several Member States (France, Germany, Ireland, and the UK). All of these legal frameworks provide different
rules. Such diversity challenges the purposes of the GDPR and EU
politics to build a “digital single market.”
1. National Legal Frameworks on Civil and Commercial
Matters
I am specifically studying the French law because the automated
decision-making requirements were originally adopted in this
country.170 Moreover, the French government has announced its
goal to improve the GDPR’s level of protection in the data subject’s
favor, for instance, in terms of the right to an explanation on automated decision-making.171 I am also briefly studying German, Irish,
and English laws.
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General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 46.
Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 150, at 95.
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See Gianclaudio Malgieri, Automated Decision-Making in the Member States: The
Right to Explanation and Other “Suitable Safeguards” in the National Legislations,
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV., Oct. 2019, at 14.
171
Loi 2018-493 du 20 juin 2018 relative à la protection des données personnelles, [Law
2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
169

2019] ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GDPR & BEYOND

127

a) French Law: A Higher Level of Protection?
The “Digital Republic Act” (Loi n° 2016-1321 pour une
République numérique) of October 7, 2016 anticipated some
provisions of the GDPR (the “Data Protection Act” or “Act”).172 The
new Data Protection Act was enacted on June 20, 2018.173
The Data Protection Act makes extensive use of the opening
clauses to increase the level of the data subject’s protection and
modify Article 11 of the previous Law 78-17.174 The Act also
prohibits decisions solely based on automated-decision making.175
Both principles provide a higher level of protection than the GDPR,
which does not prohibit decisions made solely based on automated
processing to predict or evaluate some of the data subject’s personal
details. It only provides a right not to be subject to such decisions
(Article 22, Section 1).176 Consequently, such French provisions are

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 20, 2018, p. 1 (Fr.)
[hereinafter Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data].
172
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, arts. 15–22, at 43–46
(discussing the right to be forgotten, the right to portability, the right for individuals to give
instructions relating to the storage of data, and the right to erasure and disclosure of their
personal data after their death). This Law increased the sanctioning powers of the Data
Protection Authority (CNIL): the maximum fines were increased from €150,000 to €3
million in case of data protection infringements. Id.
173
Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note 171,
at 9 (discussing how this law enables the implementation of the GDPR by updating the
Data Protection Act of Jan. 6, 1978). The Data Protection Act of Jan. 6, 1978 is also known
as “informatique et libertés.” Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux
fichiers et aux libertés [Law 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files
and Civil Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 6, 1978 (Fr.) [hereinafter Law 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 on
Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties]. The new law was challenged in
front of the Conseil constitutionnel/Constitutional Council. See Conseil constitutionnel
[CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2018-765DC, June 12, 2018, Rec. 71 (Fr.).
174
Moreover, the provisions on automated decision-making adopted by Directive
95/46/EC, repealed by the GDPR, were inspired by the Data Protection Act of Jan. 6, 1978.
See Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note 171, at
14; see also Law 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil
Liberties, supra note 173. Cf. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 87, at 43.
175
See Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note
171, art. 21, at 14 (stating that “[n]o other decision having a legal effect on an individual”
or similarly and significantly affecting him or her can be “taken solely based on [an
automated] processing of data,” including profiling).
176
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 46.
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more protective. Nevertheless, the Article 29 Working Party Guidelines interpret Article 22, Section 1 in the same manner.177
Some exceptions limit protections. The third paragraph of the
Act follows Article 22, Section 2 of the GDPR, authorizing
decisions taken solely based on automated processing when they fall
under two mandatory exceptions—i.e., points (a) and (c): contracts
and explicit consent, respectively.178 This clause of the Act, by excluding any mention of exception (b) of Article 22, Section 2 of the
GDPR, appears to reserve to other Member States the flexibility to
enact other exceptions to their national laws.179 The Data Protection
Act further reiterates the GDPR’s exceptions and the safeguards of
the data subject’s rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests (set forth
in Article 22, Section 3 of the GDPR), providing for at least the right
to obtain human intervention, the right for the data subject to express
one point of view, and the right to contest the decision.180 Moreover,
the French law requires that “the rules defining this processing as
well as the main characteristics of its implementation [be] provided
to the data subject at his request, except the secrets protected by the
law.”181
The French legislature also used the opening clause, pursuant to
Article 22, Section 2(b) of the GDPR, to create a new exception for
administrative decisions.182 In this case, the data subject has to be
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See Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 20.
See Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note
171, art. 21, at 14.
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See id.; see also General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 46.
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See Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note
171, at 14, 16, 20–21.
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Id. at 14.
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See Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note
171, art. 21, at 14. Surprisingly, this exception concerns the government, as mistrust of the
vast governmental databases led to the original adoption of the French Data Protection Law
(SAFARI project) in 1978, and there is probably no more trust in the government today.
See Peter Sayer, French Plan for Biometric Database of 60 Million People Sparks Outcry,
PCWORLD (Nov. 8, 2016, 5:51 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/3139461/frenchplan-for-biometric-database-of-60-million-people-sparks-outcry.html [https://perma.cc/94
BV-55DS]. This exception excludes the processing of sensitive data. See Law 2018-493 of
June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note 171, art. 21, at 14 (citing id.,
art. 8, at 7).
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informed about the use of an automated system183 and has an explicit
right to an individual explanation. According to the Conseil
constitutionnel (the Constitutional Council), the data controller has
to control the “algorithmic processing [as well as its developments]
to explain, in details and in an intelligible [form],” to the data subject
the way the processing was applied to his situation.184 Such
characteristics point out the machine learning methods relevant to
the data subject.
In furtherance of the goal of achieving “accessibility and comprehensibility” of the law for data subjects,185 trade secrets and IP
rights have also been subjected to higher standards. The Conseil
constitutionnel decided that, when the principles of the inner functioning of an algorithm cannot be communicated without infringing
a secret or IP interest, no individual decision can be taken on the
exclusive basis of this algorithm.186 Such a rule has a significant
impact because it is a way to reconcile, on the one hand, secrecy and
property and, on the other hand, transparency and accountability.
These conditions stated by the Conseil constitutionnel reveal the
need to consider the impact of tools and to check whether they are
able to satisfy a legal requirement for transparency. Consequently,
while algorithms that change their rules (e.g., machine learning and
deep learning systems) have to be excluded, the algorithms that are
protected by secrets or IP rights do not have to be excluded.
Besides, there is another problem that is not considered by the
Conseil constitutionnel. One can also wonder how to monitor access
to the rules defining the automated processing provided by
consumer and personal data laws. Two different agencies have
183

CODE ADMINISTRATIF [C. ADM.] [ADMINISTRATIVE CODE] art. L311-3-1 (Fr.) (It states
that an individual decision taken on the basis of an algorithmic treatment includes an
explicit mention by informing the data subject (i.e., the right to be informed)).
184
Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2018-765DC, June
12, 2018, J.O. 141, recital 71, at 13 (Adding that in cases of judicial remedy, the judge can
ask the administration to explain to the data subject how the algorithm has been
implemented. Moreover, in explaining to the subject the way processing was applied to his
situation, the data controller cannot use, as an exclusive means for an individual
administrative decision, algorithms able to change their own rules by themselves without
the data controller’s control and validation.).
185
186

Id. recital 66, at 12.
Id. recital 70, at 13.
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jurisdiction: Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la
Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (“DGCCRF”) and
the Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés (“CNIL”),
which is the French Data Protection Authority.187 Neither has
sufficient powers and human resources to ensure efficiency and
algorithmic oversight.
b) Other European National Laws
i. Germany
The German lawmakers have made extensive use of Article 22,
Section 2(b) of the GDPR in a different way than the French
legislators. Germany renewed its Data Protection Law on June
30, 2017.188 Section 37 concerns automated individual decisionmaking, including profiling, and first reiterates the safeguards of the
GDPR189 before stating in Paragraph 1 a single additional
exception to the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on
automated processing.190 Under this new exception, decisions may
be based on the processing of health data (Article 4, Section 15 of
the GDPR).191 This means that such exception applies in favor of
the healthcare sector. It is too early to say what impact such a measure will have. Nevertheless, one can already observe that the choices
made by the German and French lawmakers are wholly different.

187
See Consumer Rights in France, ANGLOINFO, https://www.angloinfo.com/how-to/
france/lifestyle/shopping/consumer-rights [https://perma.cc/XR5Q-QEHA].
188
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], June 30, 2017,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] at 2097 (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_bdsg/englisch_bdsg.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8Q6-X7HE].
189
Id. at ch. 2, sec. 37 (“In addition to the exceptions given in Article 22 (2) (a) and (c)
of [the GDPR] . . . .)
190
Id. at ch. 2, sec. 37 (The exception applies “if the decision is made in the context of
providing services pursuant to an insurance contract and (1) the request of the data subject
was fulfilled . . . or (2) the decision is based on the application of binding rules of
remuneration for therapeutic treatment . . . .”). Section 37 also outlines remedies available
to data subjects in the event their request is not granted in full: “[T]he [data] controller
[shall take] suitable measures . . . to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests, at least
the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point
of view and to contest the decision.” Id. Finally, “the controller shall inform the data subject
of these rights no later than the notification indicating that the data subject’s request will not
be granted in full.” Id.
191
See id.
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ii. Ireland
Ireland enacted the Data Protection Act in 2018.192 Article 52
concerns rights in relation to automated decision-making.193 It also
states some exceptions.194 The exceptions are broad, and a lot of
automated decisions based solely on automated processing could be
authorized or required by or under an enactment in many circumstances. Moreover, even if these conditions are not required, the
controller could use an automated decision if he adopts some
measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests. The
law thus gives significant opportunity to the data controller. Furthermore, such safeguards must include the making of arrangements to
enable one “to make representations to the controller in relation to
the decision.”195 These exceptions seem neither clear nor stringent.
iii. United Kingdom
Despite Brexit, the United Kingdom enacted a Data Protection
Act on May 23, 2018.196 Chapter 2, Section 14 concerns the safeguards of automated decision-making authorized by law.197 These

192

See Data Protection Bill 2018 (Act. No. 7/2018) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/
eli/2018/act/7/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/44W4-G9FL].
193
Id.
194
See id. These exceptions are:
where—
(a) the decision is authorised or required by or under an enactment, and
(b) either—
(i) the effect of that decision is to grant a request of the data
subject, or
(ii) in all other cases (where subparagraph (i) is not applicable),
adequate steps have been taken by the controller to safeguard the
legitimate interests of the data subject which steps shall include
the making of arrangements to enable him or her to make
representations to the controller in relation to the decision.
Id.
195
Id.
196
See Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2018/12/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/2U2N-YMMC].
197
Chapter 2, section 14 (3) states:
Where a controller takes a qualifying significant decision in relation to
a data subject based solely on automated processing—
(a) the controller must, as soon as reasonably practicable, notify the
data subject in writing that a decision has been taken based solely on
automated processing, and
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measures provide a right of information, a right to reconsider, and a
right to obtain another decision, which has to be manual or based on
automated processing and which assists a decision-making.
The right to reconsider is an interesting right because it creates
an opportunity to obtain another decision that could be more
positive.198 However, this second chance does not avoid the bias and
opacity problems of algorithmic decision-making. Once again, the
UK’s solution is different from the French and German ones.
2. National Legal Frameworks on Criminal Matters
As opposed to a Regulation, a Directive has to be implemented
in the national laws by the Member States. I will discuss the implementation of the Directive 2016/680/EU concerning criminal law
protections of personal data in both the French Data Protection Act
and in other countries.
a) French Law
Article 30, Section 1, Art. 70–9 of the French Data Protection
Act addresses automated decision-making on criminal matters.199
Paragraph 1 states a principle of prohibition concerning judicial

(b) the data subject may, before the end of the period of 21
days beginning with receipt of the notification, request the
controller to—
(i) reconsider the decision, or
(ii) take a new decision that is not based solely on automated
processing.
Id.
198

Id. at cl. 50.
[I]f a request is made to a controller under subsection (2), the controller
must, before the end of the period of 1 month beginning with receipt
of the request—
(a) consider the request, including any information provided by the
data subject that is relevant to it,
(b) comply with the request, and
(c) by notice in writing inform the data subject of—
(i) the steps taken to comply with the request, and
(ii) the outcome of complying with the request.

Id.
199
See Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, supra note
171, at 18.
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decisions.200 Paragraph 2 addresses other decisions.201 Finally,
paragraph 3 prohibits discrimination based on profiling.202 This last
paragraph is the same as the Directive.
The French provisions seem to prohibit predictive justice
and predictive policing systems based exclusively on algorithmic
decision-making. Such systems can only be used to assist decisionmaking. This interpretation is strict in a criminal matter, and the
lawmaker’s purpose is to protect the data subjects by refusing the
use of this kind of tool. This solution is one of the more stringent
ones enacted by an EU Member State. Even if decision-making
is not solely based on algorithms, such tools may nevertheless substantially influence the decision-maker.
b) Other European National Laws
i. Germany
Section 54, paragraph 1 of the new Federal Data Protection Act
on automated individual decision-making states an authorization
principle.203 Distinct from French law, this permits the use of such
tools in a criminal matter, with exceptions.204 Moreover, discrimination based on profiling is also prohibited.205 Similar to a majority
of European Member States, the German lawmakers use the same
words as the Directive and authorize by law a decision based solely

200

Id. (“No judicial decision involving an assessment of a person’s conduct may be based
on automated processing of personal data intended to assess certain aspects of that person’s
personality.”).
201
Id. (“No other decision which produces legal effects in respect of a person or
significantly affects him may be taken solely on the basis of automated data processing
intended to foresee or evaluate certain personal aspects relating to the person concerned.”).
202
Id. (“Any profiling which discriminates against natural persons on the basis of the
special categories of personal data referred to in Article 8 (1) shall be prohibited.”).
203
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], 2097, at 1 (Ger.)
(“A decision based solely on automated processing which produces an adverse legal effect
concerning the data subject or significantly affects him or her shall be permitted only when
authorized by law.”).
204
Id. (“Decisions referred to in subsection 1 shall not be based on special categories of
personal data unless suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s legally protected and
legitimate interests are in place.”).
205
Id. (“Profiling that results in discrimination against natural persons on the basis of
special categories of personal data shall be prohibited.”).
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on automated processing in criminal matters. Consequently, the
risks I pointed out previously could occur.
ii. Ireland
The solution is similar in Ireland. Chapter 4, Section 89 of the
Data Protection Act (2018) concerns rights in relation to automated
decision-making.206 Paragraph 2 states a principle of authorization.207 Paragraph 3 adds a prohibition of discrimination in the case
of profiling.208
iii. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom decided to follow a similar solution
for both civil and criminal matters.209 Section 49 of the Data
Protection Act concerns the right not to be subject to automated
decision-making.210 The UK’s criminal, civil, and commercial laws

206
207

Data Protection Act 2018 (Act No. 7/2018), ch. 4, sec. 89 (Ir.).
Id. The Act allows for automated decision-making when:
(a) the taking of a decision based solely on automated processing is
authorized by the law of the European Union or the law of the State
and the law so authorising contains appropriate safeguards for the
rights and freedoms of the data subject, including the right of the data
subject to make representations to the controller in relation to the
decision, and
(b) the controller has taken adequate steps to safeguard the legitimate
interests of the data subject.

Id.
208

Id. (“Profiling that results in discrimination against an individual on the basis of a
special category of personal data shall be prohibited.”).
209
See Data Protection Act 2018, ch. 12, sec. 49 (UK). The data controller is authorized
to make a significant decision based solely on automated processing if he guarantees the
data subject a right of information and a right to reconsider the decision based on automated
processing. Id.
210
Id. at cl. 49. According to paragraph 1, “A controller may not take a significant
decision based solely on automated processing unless that decision is required or
authori[z]ed by law.” Id. Clause 50, paragraph 2 adds some safeguards:
Where a controller takes a qualifying significant decision in relation to
a data subject based solely on automated processing—
(a) the controller must, as soon as reasonably practicable, notify the
data subject in writing that a decision has been taken based solely on
automated processing, and
(b) the data subject may, before the end of the period of 1 month
beginning with receipt of the notification, request the controller
to—
(i) reconsider the decision, or
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all cite to exactly the same provisions, even though the risks may
be higher in a criminal matter and the data subjects expect
more safeguards.
As a procedural matter, the UK applies the GDPR and implements the Directive. However, it preserves its own way, and the ECJ
has no jurisdiction to apply a judicial oversight and impose its
interpretation. Consequently, it is less relevant for the UK than for
the other member states to wonder whether the implementation
perfectly respects the European law. Nevertheless, the effects of
Brexit are not yet well understood.
Altogether, the European rules are not only too weak but also
too diverse, thanks to the enactment of an EU Regulation instead of
a Directive. A Digital Single Market Strategy was adopted on
May 6, 2015 and was built on three pillars: (1) better access for consumers and businesses to digital goods and services across Europe;
(2) creating the right conditions and a level playing field for digital
networks and innovative services to flourish; and (3) maximizing
the growth potential of the digital economy.211 Barriers result in
citizens missing out on goods and services. Nevertheless, the
unification of the rule concerning automated decision-making is
only partial and, consequently, insufficient. This fact is problematic,
especially for the private players who need to base their activities
on a single rule inside the digital single market. Despite the digital
single market being one of the EU Commission President Juncker’s
political priorities, the GDPR partially fails to achieve these goals.
Additionally, the consequences of this regulatory failure are potentially catastrophic, as economic activities are increasingly based on
algorithmic processing, and the technological potentials are
enormous. The risk is to create different levels of protection and
requirements inside the EU to regulate such tools, thus resulting in
different levels of competition between the member states.

(ii) take a new decision that is not based solely on automated
processing.
Id. at cl. 50.
211
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital
Single Market Strategy for Europe, at 3, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015).
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IV. SOLUTIONS
The algorithmic system has to be improved and not eliminated.
Other means for addressing the problem of biases and discrimination are needed. I propose some recommendations, which I hope
propel discussion moving forward.
First, some recommendations address the algorithmic system
itself. The most important improvement should be sharing
information on the system’s existence, the motivation for using it,
and its goal. Indeed, when data subjects can access intentions, they
can better understand and challenge such algorithmic systems.
Moreover, it will be useful to explain which data went into the
model (i.e., inputs) and why. Revealing these sources gives residents
the opportunity to identify potential bias from data impregnated by
historically discriminatory practices. Furthermore, describing how
developers analyzed the data could also be a requirement without
asking for publishing source code. Access to this information may
allow the public to know how developers get from data to output.
Additionally, the publication of the performance data creates
knowledge as to whether the policy goals initially communicated
are achieved.
Some restrictions related to such purposes could be requested.
One also may prohibit certain kinds of algorithms if an explanation
cannot be given to the individuals requesting it. Such a framework
is suggested by the French Conseil constitutionnel to encourage the
use of algorithms able to satisfy the transparency and accountability
requirements.212 This excludes the use of machine learning methods
with the ability to improve their performance by themselves, as
well as algorithms protected by secrets and IP rights. More broadly,
we could encourage transparency and accountability for both
the government and the private data controllers making the
administrative decisions. The explanation of the algorithms’ characteristics used to make governmental decisions could be extended for
all kind of decisions, without consideration of the private or
public sector.

212
See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2018765DC, June 12, 2018, J.O. 141, recitals 66, 70, 71, at 12–13.
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Second, other requirements could concern the ability to audit the
algorithmic system, for instance, by scholars or public regulators.
The results produced by machine learning systems are best checked
for bias and discrimination risks through an audit. Of course, the
audit has to respect the guarantees of professional trade secrets.
Moreover, it is not mandatory to have access to the source code to
control it.
Third, we have to consider the opportunity to establish a powerful regulator with a broad jurisdiction (including consumer and
competition law issues) and significant capabilities.213 An
administrative remedy with strong penalties is also necessary.
Fourth, there is opportunity to question when specific and
explicit rules of liability should arise, especially in determining
whether the human data controller is liable, without consideration of
the outcomes generated by the algorithms.
Finally, such proposed rules for algorithmic decision-making
are not necessarily related to the processing of personal data.
Consequently, it is better to separate them from personal data
regulations and to enact specific laws for this specialized area.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I have shown that the European framework fails to
address the discrimination and opacity problems of the algorithms
related to machine learning processing and fails to provide a right of
explanation regarding outcomes of automated decision-making. The
goal of algorithmic transparency is not yet successfully ensured in
the EU. The Member States could remedy this by giving more
guarantees in this regard, such as the French law seems to do.
However, this would create another problem, as companies and data
subjects would have difficulty navigating the diversity of rules
enacted by the Member States regarding algorithms and automated
decision-making. Finally, I propose some recommendations for
improving the awareness of and accountability for algorithmic and
automated decision-making.

213

See Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 117 (2017).

